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benefited this work.1 Introduction
Experiences on earlier enlargements and especially the Nice reforms demonstrate that the
design of decision-making procedures and voting rules in EU institutions belong to the
most cumbersome parts of membership negotiations. Since the institutional arrangements
and decision-making in the EU are not based on clear constitutional rules this creates un-
necessary additional costs for enlargements and potential secession. The lack of underlying
principles in the design of decision-making rules also unnecessarily increases pressures and
demands to re-negotiate the rules.
The Nice Summit in December 2000 conﬁrms the diﬃculties that may arise when en-
largements and institutional reforms are tied together.1 The main argument behind the
need of the reform was the fact that large member states have weaker representation and
less power in the Council than their share of EU population would suggest while for the
smallest countries the reverse holds. Since the current candidate countries are mainly
small nations the problem was seen more urgent in the eyes of EU leaders than before.
This started the reform process soon after the 1995 enlargement.2 In the Council of Min-
isters, the Treaty of Nice introduced the ﬁrst re-weighting of member states’ voting rights
since the establishment of the European Community in 1957.3
1In the case of eastern enlargement the Treaty of Nice deﬁnes candidate countries’ voting rights in the
Council and numbers of seats in the European Parliament and consequent vote threshold in the Council.
Strictly speaking, the latter is, however, deﬁned for EU27 and this must still be negotiated since only 10
new countries will join in the ﬁrst phase in May 2004. Possible rejection of the Accession Treaty in any
candidate country would require still another negotiation round.
2Note that there was a debate on votes in the Council before Austria’s, Finland’s and Sweden’s entry as
well. That ﬁnally led to so-called Ionnina compromise whereby 23 votes minority of the total 87 votes in
the Council can postpone the acceptance of a proposal by three months and put in under reconsideration.
Qualiﬁed majority that is needed for passage of a proposal is 62 votes, i.e. 71 per cent. The compromise
was a result of some member states’ claims for increasing the quota to 65 out of 87 votes, i.e. nearly 75
per cent.
3In 1973 the original numbers of votes were multiplied by 2.5 and Luxembourg’s votes only by 2. This,
of course had a small re-weighting eﬀect as well. Since 1973 the incumbent countries’ numbers of votes
2Although the determination of voting rights in the Council looks automatic, in practise,
it far from that. With this respect there are three striking features, ﬁrst, new entrants’
voting rights have always been negotiated as a part of their accession treaties and, second,
as the system - both before and after Nice - puts member states into categories all countries
within one category having the same number of votes, the assignment of groups to the new
entrants have always been a tough question in membership negotiations.4 Third striking
aspect is the fact that the current system, still in power till the enlargement, has not been
updated to reﬂect changes in member states relative sizes.5 In sum, it seems that eastern
enlargement was used to reform (and update) the system without regarding the two ﬁrst
shortcomings of the system.
As the entry of new member states requires incumbent countries’ unanimous agreement,
threats of vetoing a candidate country’s entry can be used to gain in negotiations on
required reforms in institutional rules or in general in EU decision-making. To avoid the
bias to decision-making institutions caused by the seek of short run gains the task of the
constitution is to design the institutional structure and the decision-making rules using
acceptable transparent principles that are neutral to changes in membership and that can
be automatically revised if the basis of these principles change.
The objective of this paper is to assess EU decision-making procedures and, related
to them, two well-known principles of designing legitimate institutions in terms of their
neutrality to membership. We argue that the constitutional rules should obey the following
two principles
² The EU as a union of states and a union of citizens
² One person one vote principle.
have remained the same.
4In terms of their populations, Sweden and Austria are rather close to middle sized countries having
ﬁve votes each. They also had this as their goal in membership negotiations. A new category of four votes
was, however, established (see Hamilton 1991 or Widgr´ en 1994 for a more detailed discussion).
5The best example is the Netherlands where the size of the population has increased by 60 per cent
since the times of the Treaty of Rome. See also Laruelle & Widgr´ en (1998).
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Figure 1: The structure of analysis
In a federation the former gives equal weights to the union of states legitimacy and the
union of citizens legitimacy. In a confederation the latter gets a lower weight and in purely
inter-governmental approach it diminishes to zero.
Figure 1 gives the structure of our analysis. We assume that the constitution gives
general desirable goals for the institutional structure in the EU and the consequent decision-
making rules, i.e. procedures, voting rights and majority rules, are deﬁned to achieve the
goals. Examples of the former could be like ”all EU citizens should be equally represented”
or ”the European Parliament and the Council should be equal decision-makers”. The
equilibrium analysis is then carried out to analyze the policy implications of the legislative
procedures and ex ante assessment of the equilibrium analysis reveals on what kind of
principles the legislative procedures are built upon and how stable or neutral to membership
these principles are.
2 The Tools
Our starting point is that the constitution should be deﬁned based on general desirable,
stable and transparent goals for the institutional structure and and the consequent more
detailed decision-making rules in the EU. More detailed procedures, voting rights and
majority rules, are then deﬁned to achieve the goals. Examples of the former could be
4like ”all EU citizens should be equally represented” or ”the European Parliament and
the Council should be equal decision-makers”. As these examples demonstrate, inﬂuence
is a crucial element in any decision-making institution. The role of the decision-making
rules or, more generally, institution design is to aﬀect power relations in institutions where
decisions are made.
Theoretically, quantitative analysis of decision-making rules can be divided into two
approaches: methods based on co-operative games and, on the other hand, non-cooperative
games. Recently, there has been a lively debate between two schools of thought on the
appropriate tools that should be used to assess and design diﬀerent constitutional decision-
making rules. Scholars of co-operative game theory apply diﬀerent power indices mainly for
assessing the implications of diﬀerent decision-making rules on actors’ inﬂuence in decision-
making. The considered agents have no particular preferences and form winning coalitions
which then implement, in the analysis, unspeciﬁed policies. Individual chances of being
part of and inﬂuencing a winning coalition are then measured by a power index.6
The second approach uses non-cooperative game theory to analyze the impact of explicit
decision procedures and given preferences over a well-deﬁned – usually Euclidean – policy
space.7 In this approach conclusions are based on equilibrium analysis, which requires
more detailed information regarding the players’ preferences. As such non-cooperative
approach does not ﬁt analysis of constitutional rules but by considering several realizations
of actors’ preference constellations one is able to draw conclusions on performance of the
constitutional rules. This uniﬁed approach can also be seen as a bridge between the two
distinct approaches.8
Co-operative approach ﬁts to institution design when the rules are understood simply
as voting weights and vote threshold that is required for the passage of a proposal. That is
6See e.g. Laruelle and Widgr´ en (1998), Baldwin et al. (2000, 2001), Felsenthal and Machover (2001),
and Leech (2002) for recent applications of traditional power indices. Felsenthal and Machover (1998) and
Nurmi (1998) contain a more general discussion regarding index-based analysis of power.
7See e.g. Steunenberg (1994), Tsebelis (1994, 1996), Crombez (1996, 1997), and Moser (1996, 1997).
8See Steunenberg et al. 1999, Napel and Widgr´ en 2002, 2003.
5why these methods ﬁt e.g. to assessment of the distribution of power in a single decision-
making body like the Council. Among the co-operative concepts perhaps the most often
used tool in analysis of constitutional rules is the Penrose-Banzhaf measure (PBM),9 which









where Mi refers to a vulnerable majority coalition with respect to player i, i.e. a winning
coalition in which i has a swing position. The PBM can be interpreted as player i0s
probability of being in the position to swing the coalition from winning to losing. Power is,
thus, deﬁned as one’s ability to contribute to the existing state of aﬀairs. To assess relative
power the PBM is often normalized and then referred to as the (normalized) Banzhaf index












Note that swings are deﬁned based on players’ positions in coalitions but the NBI gives a
player’s share of all swings as deﬁned above.
Inter-institutional aspects play a signiﬁcant role in the design of decision-making rules
and procedures. For instance, the EU Treaties deﬁne explicitly the actors that are involved
in decision-making and the procedures and in which way, i.e. the sequence of moves, of
how decisions are made. This also means that procedural aspects are important since the
sequence in which the main institutions act in decision-making is deﬁned as a part of the
voting rules.
The major drawbacks of the established power indices of cooperative games, like the
PBM above, stem from two sources. First, the indices cannot take strategic inter-institutional
or procedural aspects of EU decision-making into account and, second, they do not ex-
plicitly consider players’ preferences but rather attempt to model voting behaviour more
9It is often referred simply to as the Banzhaf index or measure (see, however, Felsenthal & Machover
(1998)).
6directly. The latter drawback is not necessarily severe in constitutional analysis. It can
also be seen as a reason to support abstract cooperative approach but the former has to
be taken more seriously even in constitutional analysis.
When there are more than one decision making institution involved with the decision
making procedure or when one is investigating the interaction between several institutions
classical power index approach faces problems as it assumes that players are voting or
moving simultaneously, which is rarely, if ever, the case in decision making procedures.
Consider a simple agenda setting game where we have an institution that makes a leg-
islative proposal to a decision making body which either accepts or rejects the proposal.
Simultaneous coalition based approach can only use the fact that all winning coalitions
must contain the acceptance of the agenda setting institution plus a required majority in
decision making institution.This approach, however, completely disregards the fact that
the agenda setter moves ﬁrst - decision making is procedural not simultaneous. Suppose
for simplicity that the agenda setter is a single player and the passage of a proposal re-
quires unanimous acceptance in the decision making body. Then the power index approach
suggests that each player in the latter is as powerful as the former but it is not trivially
true since the agenda setter moves ﬁrst.
The criticism towards classical power indices above does not, however, mean that the
core of power index approach, namely a player’s marginal contribution to the outcome is
useless. For this reason, we propose to extend above analysis from the simple coalition
framework of a priori power measurement and the very basic voting game just considered
to a more general framework. First, take a player’s marginal contribution as the best
available indicator of his potential or ability to make a diﬀerence, i.e. his a posteriori
power. Second, if this is of normative interest or a necessity for lack of precise data,
calculate a priori power as expected a posteriori power. Expectation can be with respect
to several diﬀerent aspects of a posteriori power such as actions, preferences, or procedure.
This allows the (re-)foundation of a priori measures on a well-speciﬁed notion of a posteriori
power.10
7Crucially, impact is always relative to a what-if scenario. The shadow outcome is the
group’s decision which would have resulted if the player whose power is under consideration
had chosen diﬀerently than he a posteriori did, e.g. if he had stayed out of coalition S when
he a posteriori belongs to it, or had ideal point 0 instead of 1. While in simple games the
diﬀerence between shadow outcome and actual outcome is either 0 or 1, a richer decision
framework allows for more ﬁnely graded a posteriori power.
To illustrate, let Λ = (¸1;:::;¸n) be the collection of n players’ ideal policy positions
in Rm (an m £ n matrix having as columns the ¸i-vectors representing individual players’
ideal points). In a policy space X µ Rm, the opportunities even for only marginal changes
of preference are manifold. A given ideal point ¸i can locally be shifted to ¸i + h where
h is an arbitrary vector in Rm with small norm. Which tremble directions it is reasonable
to consider in applications will depend. Multiples of the vector (1;1;:::;1) 2 Rm seem
reasonable if the m policy dimensions are independent of each other.
In any case, if the vector h that describes the direction of preference trembles has norm
khk and so ® = (®1;:::;®m) = h
khk is its normalized version, one can deﬁne
Di(Λ) := lim
t!0






as a reasonable measure of player i’s a posteriori power provided that above limit exists.
This is simply the directional derivative of the equilibrium outcome in the direction h or
®.
Having selected a meaningful measure of ex post power, it is straightforward to deﬁne
a meaningful ex ante measure. It has to be based on explicit informational assumptions
concerning players’ preferences or – if one does not want to assume preference-driven
behavior – actions. Denoting by ˜ » the random state of the world as given either by






10Another way to approach power is spatial voting is to use the inverse of the distance between actors’
ideal policies and the outcome (see Steunenberg et al. 1999 and Napel and Widgr´ en 2002 for discussion).
8EC
EC: European Commission























































































































































Figure 2: Co-decision procedure
is the ex ante power index based on ex post measure Di(¢) and decision procedure Γ.
3 Investigating the institutional structure of the EU
The EU has three main decision-making bodies: the Commission, the Council and the
European Parliament (EP) and two main decision-making procedures: consultation and
co-decision procedure (see ﬁgure 2 for the sequence of moves in co-decision procedure).
The most fundamental diﬀerence between the procedures is that the former is emphasizes
inter-governmental approach whereas the latter has more supra-national and federalist
elements. In consultation procedure, the Commission proposes and the Council decides.
Unanimous Council can amend the Commission proposal. The Commission can also decide
to not to propose and then the legislative status quo prevails. The Commission, thus exerts
agenda-setting power and gate-keeping power and the Council decision-making power. In
consultation procedure, the EP can only express its opinion on a proposal but this does not
bind the Council or the Commission. Co-decision procedure is more complicated. The
9main diﬀerence to consultation procedure is that co-decision gives signiﬁcant powers to
the EP. Figure 2 gives a detailed description of the procedure. The Commission submits
a proposal to the EP to its ﬁrst reading. The EP can accept a proposal or amend it.
In each case the proposal, the original or amended, is submitted to the Council where it
can be accepted or further amended. The former leads to outcome x1 and the latter to
a proposal x2. That can be then accepted, amended or rejected by the EP. This stage of
the procedure gives the EP some agenda setting powers. A proposal x3 is then studied by
the Commission. It can reject or accept the proposal x3 but not to amend it any more.
The next mover is the Council that can accept x3 by qualiﬁed majority in the case of
Commission acceptance and unanimously in the case of Commission rejection. Note that,
in fact, the Commission view does not bind the Council at all since by over-ruling it the
Council can start conciliation with the EP. In practise this means that EP and the Council
can together amend the Commission proposals and, as this does not require unanimous
acceptance in either of these bodies, co-decision, in fact, seems to restrict the Commission
powers signiﬁcantly.
The Conciliation Committee is chaired by the Vice-President of the European Parlia-
ment and a representative of the member state that is holding presidency in the Council.
Before the Committee meets the member state that is holding presidency has, however,
a leading role and also gate-keeping power. To put this into a more general perspective
one alternative way to model decision-making in the Conciliation Committee is a simple
agenda-setting model where the Executive makes the initiative. The Executive could be
the member state that is holding Presidency in the Council or a chosen President. The
former scenario emphasizes inter-governmental approach as it gives agenda-setting power
to each government on rotating basis whereas the latter scenario gives the agenda-setting
power to a separate supranational institution. Let us refer to these models more generally
as the Executive model. The third alternative is to interpret the procedure as (alternating
oﬀers) bargaining game between the EP and the Council (for details see Napel & Widgr´ en
2003).
As mentioned above, consultation procedure relies purely on inter-governmental ap-
10proach. That is why it can be best applied in decision-making on policy domains that
belong to enhanced co-operation projects. The degree of supranationalism can be mea-
sured by the Commission’s power relative to the Council. Within the Council OPOV
principle should hold.
Co-decision procedure can be interpreted as federal approach requiring then that both
OPOV and USC principles hold and the latter guarantees equal weights to the EP and the
Council. If the constitution gives higher weight to the Council co-decision moves towards
inter-governmental approach.
Table 1 shows the eﬀects of Nice reforms on majority threshold before and after the
enlargement and the eﬀects of enlargement with under pre-Nice and post-Nice quota. Table
2 gives the corresponding eﬀects in co-decision procedure. 11 The total eﬀect can be
computed either by by taking the eﬀect of enlargement under the old threshold and then
the threshold eﬀect or by taking the eﬀect of the change in threshold and then the eﬀect
of the enlargement under the new threshold. The total eﬀects are shown on the two
rightmost columns of the third row. As before EP refers to the European Parliament,
CM to the Council and EC to the Commission. In both tables columns 2 and 3 give the
pre-enlargement ﬁgures, columns 4 and 5 post-enlargement ﬁgures and columns 6 and 7
the diﬀerences.
Table 1 shows that both the Council and the Commission gained somewhat in consulta-
tion procedure as a result of Nice reforms. More generally, this procedure is a simple inter-
governmental almost a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer agenda-setting game. With an exception
of very high quotas membership seems to beneﬁt the agenda-setter, i.e. the Commission,
whereas the legislature, i.e. the Council, seems to loose power. To restore the balance
between the two enlargements give Member States incentives to increase the vote thresh-
old, like it was decided in Nice. It is worth noting though that each individual Member
State loses power due to an enlargement since the number of Member States in the Council
11Here we disregard the eﬀects of the changes in inter-Council distribution of power. According to
the earlier results the power distribution within the Council does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on inter-
institutional distribution of power at the aggregate level.
11Table 1: The eﬀects of Nice reforms and enlargement on strategic inter-institutional power
in consultation procedure
Current EU Enlarged EU Diﬀerence
CM EC CM(E) EC(E) DCM DEC
Q=71 per cent 0.813 0.531 0.744 0.592 -0.069 0.061
Q=74 per cent 0.922 0.477 0.831 0.549 -0.092 0.072
Diﬀerence 0.109 -0.054 0.086 -0.043 0.017 0.018
Table 2: The eﬀects of Nice reforms and enlargement on strategic inter-institutional power
in co-decision procedure
Current EU Enlarged EU Diﬀerence
EP CM EP(E) CM(E) DEP DCM
Q=71 per cent 0.178 0.658 0.173 0.668 -0.005 0.010
Q=74 per cent 0.162 0.731 0.162 0.727 0.000 -0.004










































































Figure 3: Strategic Power in Consultation Procedure
increases.
In consultation procedure, the threshold in the Council that balances power between the
Commission and the Council is 67 per cent in the EU15 and remains the same in the EU27.
Figure 3 demonstrates this more generally. It shows the eﬀects of enlargement on strategic
power measures of the Council that in increasing with the quota and the Commission
that is decreasing with the quota used in the Council. The ﬁgure shows that the eﬀect
of the enlargement is almost monotonic with the quota. Even at high quotas the Council
loses power and the Commission gains. As an exception, at unanimity rule, the Council
gains and there are no signiﬁcant eﬀects for the Commission. From the viewpoint of inter-
institutional power this makes unanimity rule stable as there are no strong incentives to
deviate from it when the membership expands. Figure 3 suggests that two-thirds majority
is another stable candidate.
In the EU, consultation procedure was the only legislative procedure till 1986 and
unanimity rule was the only voting rule till 1966. After that Luxembourg compromise
made it, however, possible to ask for unanimity on the grounds of national interests even
































































































Figure 4: Strategic Power in Co-decision Procedure
introducing a new procedure to serve the Single Market programme. Still today unanimity
is more often applied in consultation procedure than in co-decision procedure.
If unanimity rule is, in terms of inter-institutional balance of power, so stable one
may wonder what explains the deviation from it in the EU since the late-1980s. The
explanation may follow from the fact that it is stable only from the viewpoint of inter-
institutional balance of power but not on the viewpoint of intra-institutional distribution
of power. In relative terms, the big countries lose more than the small countries as the
membership expands and unanimity rule is applied. This question is analyzed more in
detail in section 5 below.
In co-decision procedure, the magnitude of the eﬀects is smaller than in consultation
procedure. Especially the impact of the enlargement is practically zero (see table 2). The
main diﬀerence between the procedures is that, in consultation procedure, the equilibrium
outcome is determined by the policy positions of (the median voter in) the Commission
and the pivotal player in the Council the former being the legislative initiator and, in co-
decision procedure, the policy positions of the pivotal player in the Council and the median
voter in the EP both being decision-makers in the Conciliation Committee. In both cases
14the source of Council gains is the fact that it uses qualiﬁed majority threshold whereas the
Commission and the EP use absolute majority. The increase of the quota from 71 per cent
to 74 per cent beneﬁtted the Council as can be seen in table 2.
Figures 4 and 5 give the inter-institutional balance of power in co-decision procedure
in EU-27 and the impact of the enlargement on it when the procedure is modelled as the
Executive model as discussed above. Figure 4 shows that the Council exerts more power
than the EP as far as the quota is higher than 62 per cent. The Executive is more powerful
than the EP regardless of the quota. The division of power between the Executive and the
Council is equal at two-thirds majority rule. This, in fact, corresponds with consultation
procedure where the Commission is the Executive, which is intuitively plausible.
Using the current vote threshold in the Council, co-decision procedure is very neutral
to the enlargement. There are no substantial changes in inter-institutional power. For
the quotas higher than this the enlargement gives increasing power gains for the Council
whereas eﬀects for the EP and the member state that is holding presidency. In sum, it
seems that the increase in majority quota that was decided in Nice can be explained by
the balance of power in consultation procedure. In co-decision procedure, the old and the
new threshold fall into stable region. It is worth noting, however, that in both procedures
enlargements tend to give incentives for member states to increase the quota.
The Executive model of the co-decision procedure can be seen as a combination of two
”sub-games”. If the Executive has agenda setting power in the Conciliation Committee
the relationship between the Executive and the Council is like the one in consultation
procedure. If this is not the case conciliation committee can be interpreted as an alternating
oﬀers bargaining between the median voter in the EP and the pivotal player in the Council.
In weak Executive scenario, which corresponds rather well with the current co-decision
procedure, there is a clear ﬁrst mover advantage in the Conciliation Committee. In rel-
ative terms, the advantage works in favour of the Council. If it is the ﬁrst mover in the
Conciliation Committee it is more powerful than the EP regardless of the quota. If the EP
oﬀers ﬁrst the Council is more powerful if the quota exceeds two-thirds, like in consultation





























































































Figure 5: The Eﬀect of Enlargement on Strategic Power in Co-decision Procedure
is the fact that the ideal policy position of the pivotal player in the Council is likely to
be more biased towards the legislative status quo than position of the median voter in the
EP. This works like patience in normal bargaining set-up.12
In powerful Executive scenario, which is modelled above, the distribution of power be-
tween the Council and the EP is neutral to the enlargement. If the Executive is the rotating
Council Presidency the Council is more powerful than the EP. This roughly corresponds
with the case where the Council is the ﬁrst mover in alternating oﬀers bargaining. The
total inﬂuence of the Council is a vertical sum of CM and PR curves in ﬁgure 4.
If the Executive is a separate institution there are two alternatives. First, there is the
so-called double-hat idea where an elected Commission President acts as the President of
the Council as well and, second, there is a proposal that Presidents of the Commission
and the Council are two diﬀerent institutions the latter being elected for instance by a
qualiﬁed majority of the Council. Figure 4 also captures the impact of these proposals
in co-decision. If the Commission President becomes the head of the Council PR-curve
12See Napel & Widgr´ en (2003), for details.
16gives the power of the Commission in the procedure. It would shift some powers from the
Council to the Commission but still using the current quota in the Council would maintain
its role as the most powerful actor. If a separate President is chosen the PR-curve gives
his/her power and the Commission is left out with its gate-keeping power. That has an
important and potentially far-reaching implication, namely co-decision becomes ineﬃcient,
like it is the case with rotating Presidency as well.
4 Ineﬃciency in co-decision
An often used method to assess decision-making eﬃciency refers to an institutions capa-
bility to act or make decisions.13 The main drawback of the eﬃcacy measure like this
is its lack of strategic aspects. An abstract measure of an institution’s capability to act
simply computes the share of majority coalitions of all coalitions. Taking strategic aspects
into account might give a diﬀerent and more procedure related picture on the sources of
ineﬃciency. For simplicity let us assume that the policy space is normalized to unit
interval and the actors have ideal points that are assumed to be uniformly distributed on
the interval. As the status quo is normalized to zero this means that all stakeholders are
on the same side of the status quo and there are always gains from trade. There, thus,
always exists a proposal that makes all players better-oﬀ than the status quo.
A common feature in consultation and co-decision procedures is that the Commission
proposal can be amended and the amended proposal can then be accepted without the
Commission’s consent. In consultation procedure, unanimous Council can do that and, in
co-decision procedure, the Conciliation Committee. This weakens the Commission as an
executive and also makes the procedures ineﬃcient. Since the Commission exerts gate-
keeping power it may decide to not to make a proposal if it foresees that the outcome
would be worse than the legislative reference point, i.e. status quo. That creates status
quo bias and hence ineﬃciency since not all gains from trade are materialized. Note that
13For applications regarding the eastern enlargement see e.g. Baldwin et al. 2000, 2001 and the 1995
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Figure 6: Status Quo Bias in Co-decision Procedure
there might also exist gains from trade in the sense that all actors prefer less integration
or more decentralization. Status quo bias might then create centralization bias.
Figure 6 demonstrates this. It shows the probabilities of status quo bias, i.e. percentage
of issues where the Commission has incentives to use its gate-keeping power in legislative
equilibrium. The ﬁgure gives the probabilities before and after enlargement as the quota
in the Council is let to vary.
The conclusions that can be drawn from ﬁgure 6 are quite opposite to those based on
passage probabilities. First, increasing the quota in the Council decreases ineﬃciency and,
second, enlargement has practically no eﬀect at all. The ﬁrst phenomenon can be explained
by the fact that a higher threshold decreases eﬃcacy in the Conciliation Committee. That
makes it less likely that the Commission is willing to use its gate-keeping power. The out-
come in the Conciliation Committee is then biased towards the status quo due to the quota
used in the Council. The price of improving eﬃciency is deteriorating eﬃcacy, which might
limit the scope of EU decision-making superﬂuously. Using the current threshold gives the
probability of status quo bias of more than one-tenth, which is substantial. Theoretically,
18every tenth decision that would have beneﬁtted all is not taken.14
One important diﬀerence between co-decision and consultation procedure is that in the
former the Council and the EP use the same quota in the conciliation committee as when
they decide on Commission proposals. In consultation procedure amendments require a
higher quota for their passage than Commission proposals. In co-decision procedure similar
diﬀerentiation with vote thresholds in conciliation committee and on Commission propos-
als would reduce status quo bias in gate-keeping sense without necesarily deteriorating
eﬃcacy in passage probability sense. It is worth noting, however, that this solution only
reduces ineﬃciency and is not able to remove it completely.15 That would also give some
powers to the Commission in the procedure. Another even more straightforward solution
could be to make the Commission politically accountable but that would not remove the
ineﬃciency property from the procedure per se. A third alternative would be to abolish
the Commission’s monopoly as an initiator and to share it with another supranational
institution, namely the EP.
5 Equal representation of EU citizens
In the inter-governmental conference 2000, the Commission proposed and advocated the
so-called simple dual (SD) majority voting rule in the Council. SD rule reﬂects the Union
of nations and union of citizens principle since when it is applied a legislative proposal
needs the acceptance of majority of member states and majority of EU citizens to pass.
it is worth noting that SD rule is not weighted voting. Member states governments do
not have voting weights but the rule itself determines whether a proposal passes and the
14In consultation procedure, status quo bias does not practically exist in the above-mentioned sense.
Unanimous Council can amend Commission proposals but the likelihood of amending them in a way that
leads the Commission to use its gate-keeping power is very small. In the EU15 the probability of status
quo bias in consultation procedure is 1:9 ¢ 10¡6 and in the EU27 even smaller.
15A solution where conciliation requires unanimous consent of the EP and the Council would in practise
remove it but would decrease eﬃcacy dramatically.
19distribution of power among member states.16
The Commission proposal was meant to the Council. More generally SD rule is typical
for federal states. For instance in the U.S. the majority of states part of the deﬁnition is
reﬂected by the decision-making rules in the Senate and the majority of citizens part in the
House of Representatives. If both chambers are equally powerful, like in the U.S., and the
assessment is only interested in national distribution of power the analysis gives the same
conclusions in one and two-chamber decision-making. In the context of the EU co-decision
among the Council and the Parliament has similarities with a normal federal system with
exception that the Council and the Parliament use diﬀerent quotas.
One person one vote (OPOV) principle is a cornerstone in designing democratic insti-
tutions and fair allocation of power in a federation or two-tier decision-making in general.17
In big states citizens have less power in choosing their national government than citizens
in small states. This requires that the big states are compensated in the Council voting
weights. The right compensation to ensures OPOV principle is the well known square-root
rule due to Penrose (1946). Applied to the EU Council, fair power of countries should be










where mi denotes the population of country i and ¯
¤ the fair (Banzhaf) index of power.
Table 3 gives the summary of diﬀerences between normalized Banzhaf indices when
two alternative dual majorities are used in the Council of the EU15 and EU27. The
diﬀerence that we use is the sum of squares of the diﬀerences between the actual Banzhaf
indices and the fair ones. In the table, D50 refers to simple dual majority, i.e. absolute
majority of states and citizens, D62 refers to absolute majority of states and 62 per cent
16Simple dual majority can, however, be interpreted as a weighted voting with an additional safety-net
that guarantees support from an absolute majority of member states.
17For earlier analysis on the EU see Laruelle and Widgr´ en 1998.









majority of citizens18 D74 to absolute majority of states and 74 per cent majority of citizens
respectively. The alternatives SD50, SD62 and SD74 refer to similar dual majorities where
and absolute majority of member states and 50 per cent, 62 per cent and 74 per cent
majority of member states’ square-rooted population is needed to pass legislation. Let us
refer to these rules to as square-root dual majorities. The last rows of each table give the
results regarding the Nice reform.
The performance of the three categories suggests, not surprisingly that square-root
weights give power distribution that is very close to the square-root rule. That is a common
feature of classical power indices. When the number of players increases power measures
converge to voting weights if the variance of weights is relatively small. In the category
of square-root dual majorities the performance is almost as good with an exception of the
case where an absolute majority of square-rooted population is needed (SD50), which in
terms of equal representation of EU citizens turns out to be the worst voting rule. In the
category of dual majorities, simple dual majority performs the best.
Figure 7 conﬁrms and generalizes the results in table 3. The ﬁgure shows the sums of
18The choice of 62 per cent is inspired by the Nice reform, which deﬁnes the voting rules in the Council



















































Figure 7: The diﬀerence between OPOV principle and the Nice rules and square-root dual
majorities
squares of the diﬀerences between the fair power indices based on OPOV principle and the
actual ones when the Nice weights and square-root dual majorities are used. It is common
for both models that there is a wide range of majority rules that are equally good. For the
Nice weights there are practically no diﬀerences in the range of thresholds between 55 and
80 per cent. The performance of square-root dual majorities remain unchanged between 55
and 70 per cent quotas. Note however that square-root dual majorities perform better that
the Nice weights at their best can do on the range between 50 and 90 per cent quotas. Most
important conclusion that can be drawn from table 3 and ﬁgure 7 is that, to fulﬁl the OPOV
principle, square-root dual majorities seem to ﬁt the best to the Council. Moreover, the
rule is as transparent as simple dual majority proposed by the Commission, which would
serve as the second best solution here.
Figure 7 also explains why unanimity rule is not stable in the Council although in both
procedures there is a tendency towards it. The diﬀerence between OPOV principle and the
actual power increases rapidly when the quota is high enough. This is unfavourable to big
countries creating deviating forces. Interestingly, in both procedures there are other stable
22majority rules than the unanimity rule and they belong to the range where the diﬀerence
to OPOV principle is minimized.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied EU decision-making procedures and voting rules. The
particular focus of the analysis has been on their neutrality to membership. The paper has
assessed inter-institutional power in the two main decision-making procedures of the EU,
decision-making eﬃcacy and eﬃciency and national distribution of power and the impact
of expanding membership in all these. The objective of the paper has been to study how
well some general constitutional principles can be used to design decision-making in the
EU and how neutral decision-making rules that are based on such principles.
The paper demonstrates that the inter-institutional power in EU procedures is relatively
neutral to expanding (or decreasing) membership. Especially this holds for co-decision
procedure. In both procedures there is a tendency towards unanimity rule if the quota is
decided by Member States governments but both procedures have stable majority rules
The extreme alternatives of the nature of the EU are purely inter-governmental Union
and USC principle. The former suggests strong Council and no or very minor role for
the Commission and the EP. The latter suggests co-decision between the EP and the
Council and relatively strong but accountable Commission. If the current rules are used
in consultation procedure, the Council is the most powerful actor. Despite to its role as
the initiator the Commission exerts less power. The diﬀerence is not very big though.
Consultation procedure is not, therefore, purely inter-governmental procedure but as it
fails to meet the USC principle it should not be applied in policy domains that belong to
the Union competence but rather in the policy domains that are organized under enhanced
cooperation. The results suggest that two-thirds majority balances the power between the
Commission and the Council.
Co-decision procedure ﬁts better to the USC principle. The paper models the procedure
by giving a strong oﬃcial role to the Executive that can be the Member State that is holding
23presidency or an elected President. The former model makes the Council the most powerful
actor and makes it impossible to obey the USC principle. The role of the EP is weaker
and there are no majority rules that make the EP equal partner to the Council.
Another feature of the procedure is the Commission role, which has been diminished
to gate-keeping since the Council and the EP use the same threshold in the Conciliation
Committee and when they decide on Commission proposals. That makes the procedure
ineﬃcient. The likelihood of ineﬃciency is neutral to membership though.
A solution candidate for ineﬃciency problem is to apply higher thresholds in the Con-
ciliation Committee than when deciding on Commission proposals. Another solution could
be to make the Commission politically accountable to the EP and the Council, which would
diminish harmful gate-keeping. These solutions would not remove the problem completely
though.
An alternative approach would be to divide the right to initiate between the Commission
and the EP. As the EP is a part of Conciliation Committee this would make the procedure
eﬃcient. It would also intensify competition between the proposals. Ineﬃciency problem
can also be solved by introducing a strong Executive. It is worth noting, however, that
this requires the so-called double-hat Presidency where the President of the Commission
is the President of the Council as well.
Distribution of national power is another important aspect of EU institutions. Intra-
institutional distribution of power does not have signiﬁcant impact on inter-institutional
distribution of power but enlargements have eﬀects on intra-institutional power and the per-
formance of USC and OPOV principles. That is why this question is analyzed separately.
There seems to be a trade-oﬀ between OPOV and USC principles as the constitutional
base for decision-making rules in the EU. Simple dual majority rule that takes the USC
rule most literally does not perform very well in terms of citizens’ equal representation. It
would be an improvement to the current weighting though. The so-called square-root dual
majorities are as transparent as (simple) dual majorities and carry out power distribution
that are practically identical with the fair one.
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